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Shades of Global Power
Reflections on the Emerging World Order
Report prepared for the Research
Committee on
Political Power, International Political Science Association, 19th
World Congress, Durban, South Africa, July 2003
“For total greed, rapacity, heartlessness, and irresponsibility
there is nothing to
match a nation.
Lewis Thomas, The Lives of a Cell
Les petits pays ne
sont pas moins
méchants que les grands,
Mais ils n’ont pas les
moyens
de l’être.
Georges Clemenceau,
Reflection
on WWI
Abstract:
In the present global dynamics, “nation-building” in the
classical Westphalian sense, is unrealistic, and even
counterproductive. Paradoxically, today's global turmoils provide
us with opportunities to promote federalism: Federalism and the
broadest autonomy of “estans”
as the new actors on the global scene. Whether issue of existing
sovereign
nation-states or new regional arrangements,estans would combine and coalesce
under specialized regional overarching federations.
Background
Studying
“world
order,” one can discern periods of evolution – at times leading
to the obsolescence of the prevailing order – and episodes of revolution
overwhelming and dismantling the established patterns of behavior and
“understanding”
among peoples. The dynamics of the process are best discernible in
historical
retrospect; as in some cases the revolutionizing factors try to claim
the
established order as their own even though the upheaval they create
metamorphoses
the old patterns. With no pretension to elaborating an exhaustive
historical
list, a few examples are evoked here to make the point.
Within
the Mesopotamian valley there was a period of Sumerian and Akkadian
“understanding”
and “rules of engagement” in the intercourse and wars among the
neighboring
cultures, whether city-states or kingdoms, which lasted some twenty
five
centuries. It was disrupted by the emergence of the Achaemenid Empire
which
“revolutionized” the Mesopotamian “world order” and imposed the
dominion
of the “Great King,” itself dismantled by the heirs of Alexander the
Great.
Alexander himself, at some point, did have the pretension of
continuing,
with some modifications, the legacy of the “Great King.” The Eastern
Roman
and the Sassanid empires developed rules of engagement which evolved
over
five centuries, later to be revolutionized by the Arab invasion and the
institution of Islamic rules of conduct among the conquered peoples.
Genghis
Khan swept across Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe,
overwhelming
the rules of conduct that had evolved under Islam and created Khanates
from Ukraine to the Far East. Different “world orders” have had
different
lengths, impacts and spreads. One of the more resilient world orders
was
that of China with its concept of the “middle kingdom” – i.e., China as
the center of the world order – which even the alien dynasties
(Yüan
– descendants of Genghis Khan – 1280-1367 and Ch’ing – Manchus –
1644-1910)
embraced as their own.
Westphalia
The
example
more pertinent to this essay is the evolutions and revolutions of the
Western
world’s conception of “world order.” Indeed, policy makers advocating
“nation-building”
as a feature of the United States foreign policy evoke one of its
cornerstones,
namely, the Westphalian system these days. But the Peace of Westphalia
was not, per se, about “nation-building” and “nation-state.”
As
the Renaissance
and the Reformation eroded the European feudal system of the Dark Ages,
the residues of the old world order, that of checks and balances of imperium
and sacerdotum, encumbered the emerging states whose new
firepower
capabilities were redrawing the map of Europe. As one of the final
points
of the Thirty Years Wars, the main thrust of the Peace of Westphalia of
1648 was to legitimize the power of the kings and the emperor over
their
domains through mutual recognition. Kingdoms, at this stage, were not
yet
“nation-states.” Louis the XIVth could still exclaim “l’état
c’est moi.”
With
the rise
of the bourgeoisie, the idea of “nation-state” had been simmering
within
the European states. The conflicts between the parliament and the king
in England were the first inklings of a bourgeois “nation-state”
consciousness.
But we can speak of a “nation-state” proper only after the English
Glorious
Revolution and the enactment of the Bill of Rights by the Parliament in
1689. Even then, however, the European “world order” did not recognize
“nation-states” – “City states” yes, because their bourgeoisie had
attained
the coherence and consciousness for political and economic control, but
not “nation-states.” The European “world order” remained that of the
mutual
recognition of sovereign monarchs.
Indeed,
American and French Revolutions – which did create “nation-states” –
were
deemed by European powers as aberrations of the legitimate world order.
The American Revolution was remote but the French Revolution could not
be tolerated. European monarchies banded together to overthrew Napoleon
as the offshoot of revolution, even though he sought legitimacy by
declaring
himself emperor. The Congress of Vienna restored the Ancien
Régime.
By then, however, the bourgeois idea of nationalism and “nation-state”
had spread across Europe and culminated in the 1848 Revolutions of
Nationalities.
Despite those bourgeois revolutions, the “Concert of Europe” instituted
at the Congress of Vienna, held the European powers together, bound by
alliances and ententes as they spread the energies of their
nation-states
into colonial expansions. Some of the instigators of WWI believed that
that war was only a variation on the theme of the Concert of Europe.
But
that was not the case. Western bourgeoisie had come of age.
The
Western concept of nation-state should be put in the context of the
industrial
revolution and the rise of the bourgeoisie, with their corollaries of
technological
developments in the means of production and transportation,
rationalization
of division of labor and corporate capitalism – a rather unique
economic,
political and cultural concoction which cannot be easily replicated.
National
flags, national anthems, national history and myths, the consolidation
of national frontiers, national education and language were frameworks
for national consciousness of the masses to create a sense of belonging
between the entrepreneurs and the workers and to secure the market for
national products.
The
First World War blew-up the residues of the Concert of Europe and
revolutionized
the world order. Austro-Hungarian, Prussian, Russian and Ottoman
empires
were no more. The different peoples which had been overarched by those
empires clamored for recognition and identity. The League of Nations,
thanks
to Woodrow Wilson, recognized the “national” aspirations of the peoples
of Europe and proceeded to “nation-building.” The prevailing model of
the
victors at the time was “nation-state” and it was applied to peoples
who
had not attained the national cohesiveness of Western nation-states.
So,
Czechs and Slovaks were thrown together; Transylvania, Bessarabia and
Rumania
were made into a kingdom and Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosnians,
Montenegrins,
Macedonians and Kosovo Albanians were bunched together as Yugoslavia
with
an imported monarch. Just about all those “nation states” have now
disintegrated.
The Non-Western
“Nation-States”
In
the pre-WWI Western world order the non-Western world was not part of
the
“community of nations.” It was to be explored, acquired, exploited and
settled. In their imperial and colonial drive, Europeans carved the
maps
of the other continents. Even older world orders such as those of China
and Persia became part of European imperial designs. In their exposure
to Western nationalism some in the non-Western world became attuned to
the idea of national identity. But the circumstances and conjunctures
which
had concocted the Western bourgeois capitalism were not present in
their
environment. What motivated them above all was anti-colonial fervor.
The
“national aspirations” which were recognized for the peoples of Europe
at the conclusion of WWI did not yet fully apply to the non-Western
people.
The Mandate system permitted the victorious colonial powers to hold
onto
some of their colonies for an indefinite future while requiring them to
chaperon some others, which had the potentials, towards
“nation-statehood.”
But the maps were designed on colonial patterns. Thus, for example,
parts
of the Kurdish people, Shiites Arabs and Sunni tribes were bundled
together
as Iraq under a Hashemite king from Hejaz.
In
the aftermath of WWII, with the wars of independence in the 1950’s and
60’s and the collapse of the colonial system, emerged “nation-states”
with
little coherence in national identity. Some, with strongmen or dominant
tribes at their helm, tried “nation-building” by imposing national
languages,
national education, suppression of minorities and strong military
rules.
In the polarized world order of the Cold War, depending on their
orientation,
many of these pseudo-nation-states were held together by one or the
other
antagonistic camp: Suharto in Indonesia, Mobutu in the Congo, Mengistu
in Ethiopia, Said Bare in Somalia, Al Nimeri in Sudan. Others used the
space where the two Cold War camps canceled each other out to hold
sway,
like Tito in Yugoslavia. Some were too fragile to stay in one piece.
East
Pakistan feeling, among other identity incongruencies, that its jute
exports
were exploited by West Pakistan, broke away and became Bangladesh.
There
was an essential aspect of the traditional Western nation-states which
was distorted in the new pseudo-nation-states. In the West, it was in
the
“national interest” of the country to develop its national territory in
order to increase its overall national potentials. National taxes and
revenues
generated in certain parts and sectors of the country were directed
towards
the development of other underdeveloped areas. And national identity
and
feelings paralleled and approved that distribution of national wealth.
The Tennessee Valley Authority was good for the whole nation of U.S.A.
In the pseudo-nation-states the systemic norms remained disjointed.[1]
Regimes, depending on their ideological or tribal affiliations,
diverted
the national wealth with little cohesive national identity support.
Saddam
Hussein built many more palaces in Tikrit than in Nasiriya. One of the
causes of the collapse of Yugoslavia was that Croatia was no longer
willing
to have its hard currency earnings used for the development of Kosovo
in
the name of Yugoslav national interests.
Indeed,
in the
globalized economy, even the Western nation-states are hard pressed to
raise taxes for national social programs and regional developments.
Today’s
conditions are opposite the centripetal forces which coalesced Western
nation-states. Globalization is pushing national governments to reduce
social programs and hence taxes in order to attract foreign investment
while ethnicities within their borders seek recognition and autonomy.
The
end of the
Cold War left regimes which had been held together by the US-USSR
bipolarity
without a compass. The countries in the horn of Africa, for example,
which
had changed camp a couple of times during the Cold War were left on
their
own. The implosion of the USSR produced a number of independent states
with potentials of splitting further – such as Abkhazia in Georgia,
Nagorno-Karabaq
in Azerbaijan or Chechnya in Russia.
Many
of the
regimes with socialist economies, instead of studying the causes of the
collapse of the Soviet socialist regime and correcting their mistakes,
succumbed to the allure of triumphant market economy.[2]
With
sole super-power
status, it behooved U. S. foreign policy to grope for a new world order.
From primus
inter pares
to Primacy
Speaking
of evolution
of world orders to which we referred earlier, one could say that the
Cold
War inflicted a paralyzing blow to the United Nations system soon after
its creation. Retrospectively, while one could argue that it was the
existence
of the UN that avoided the holocaust of a nuclear conflagration, one
should
also be amazed that it chugged along during the Cold War at all. There
were, of course, circumstances and conjunctures which helped the UN’s
survival.
What would have happened, for example, if the USSR had not been absent
from the Security Council and had vetoed the resolution on Korea in
1950?
It was finally in 2003 that by attacking Iraq in contravention of the
UN
Security Council the United States challenged the prevailing
international
legal norms enshrined in the UN Charter.
During
the Cold
War the United States, as the “leader of the free world,” played the
role
of primus inter pares among the Western powers and, up to the
time
when the non-aligned nations became predominant within the United
Nations,
used it as an instrument of its foreign policy. The U. S. did, however,
maintain its predominance where it mattered. Notably, in the financial
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund,
and the regional military alliance of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
(NATO).
The
end of the
Cold War set the stage for a new world order revolution with the United
States in the principal role. “Revolution” because like other
catalyzers
of past world order revolutions – whether Persians, Romans, Mongols,
Muslims
or Western European colonial empires – America brings its own
idiosyncrasies
to jar other global realities.
America’s
geographic specificity as a power on a continent separated from the
rest
of the world by two oceans has given the U.S. a sense of security all
along
its short history, probably even up to September 11, 2001. It has also
permitted the U.S. the ambivalent attitude of oscillating between
political
isolation and engagement in world affairs. That attitude has resulted
in
patchy experiences in diplomacy. George Washington's Farewell Address
to
the effect that: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign
nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as
little political connection as possible" has inspired American
policy-makers
through the ages, including pre-911 George W. Bush.
There
were two components in George Washington’s proposition: 1. foreign
nations
as political interlocutors and 2. markets for our commercial relations.
The entanglement of the two is reflected in U. S. foreign policy
throughout
its history – from the invasion of the coast of Barbary to the Monroe
doctrine
and the “open door.” Cognizance of these two dimensions will help us
better
understand the present realpolitik/liberalism confusion
reflected
in the policy of “nation-building” in the context of globalization.
It
is noteworthy that since the end of the Cold War U.S. foreign policy
makers
pondering new road maps have remained handicapped by using the old maps
they attribute to the Westphalian system and considering the
nation-states
as the ultimate building blocks for world order. While the American
foreign
policy establishment considered the implosion of the USSR as desirable
and justified – because the states that emerged had political status as
republics and historical justifications – it has dreaded the crumbling
of nation-states into pieces and has attempted to keep them together:
Lebanon,
Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and presently Iraq. It is that while the
American
marketers would like to talk to anybody, the U.S. foreign policy
establishment
wants to have nation-states as interlocutors in order to hold them
responsible
for their acts. The phenomenon also has the taint of another American
idiosyncrasy,
namely, that of the frontier spirit. American foreign policy seeks
somebody
on the other side of the border to confront. In confrontation America
would
subvert the adversary in order to turn it into a friendly nation and
even
dismember it to promote American commercial and economic interests –
the
second dimension of Washington’s Farewell Address – as was, for
example,
the case of the separation of Panama from Colombia.
There
is yet another dimension in the United States’ dealings with other
countries
which has to be taken into account: that of the missionary zeal of the
nineteenth century turned, since WWII, into the propagation of the
“American
way of life,” with its main components of freedom, democracy,
opportunity
and free enterprise. A quick look shows that the realization of some of
these components was possible in America because of the American
specificity
not available in other cultures. Take freedom: beyond all its legal and
political connotations, in the American psyche, it has a dimension of
spatial
movement not easily realizable in other cultures. Or, take opportunity
and free enterprise. They too should be put in the context of the story
of the pioneers and the vast space at their disposal.
Socio-psychological
surveys have shown that the Horatio Alger myth is well and alive in the
American psyche. While one percent of the population owns 49% of the
national
wealth and only two percent of Americans consider themselves rich,
according
to a recent Gallup survey thirty-one percent of Americans surveyed
expect
to become rich in their lifetime.[3]
It is doubtful that that kind of hopeful attitude could be easily
inculcated
into the people of other traditional cultures where the distribution of
wealth is even more lopsided, and where poverty is endemic and wealth
considered
a birth right.
Finally,
to
the brief list of American idiosyncrasies should be added the fact that
U.S. foreign policy is more sensitive to national politics and the
lobbies
than other cultures. Thus, for example, when the Cold War ended and
there
was talk of conversion to a peace economy, the arms manufacturers lobby
– the military/industrial complex – and their home-state politicians
dangled
the dangers of unemployment and economic slowdown to counter the
scuttling
of arms development programs. With the benign neglect of the 1990’s,
the
U.S. became the world’s major arms exporter. Of course, there was more
to that than just the danger of unemployment.
In
1990 Dick Cheney, then secretary of defense to President George Bush
senior,
commissioned a study on the future course of the U.S. military posture.
The “five-twenty-one brief” – because it was presented to Cheney on May
21 – expounded the idea of “American primacy”. It postulated
that
the U. S. should strive to remain the only super-power and its foreign
policy should aim at hindering other countries – nation-states – from
attaining
that status. With the defeat of Bush senior that idea was shelved. The
Clinton administration applied Realpolitik selectively.
Madeleine
Albright was candid enough to say that we try to push around Vietnam on
human rights issues because it is a small power, but not China. In the
early years of his administration, Clinton’s foreign policy was
influenced,
paradoxically, by the presence in his cabinet of General Colin Powell
as
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a leftover from George Bush
senior’s
administration.[4]
The “Powell Doctrine” was based on prudence and certainty before
engaging
U.S. military power in international conflicts and limited U.S. foreign
policy options.
As
late as the year 2000, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush’s foreign
policy
adviser, wrote: “The United States has found it exceedingly difficult
to
define its ‘national interests’ in the absence of Soviet power.”[5]
The Bush administration’s initial approach to foreign policy was more
isolationist
than interventionist. George W. Bush did not feel comfortable getting
involved
in world affairs. His original inclination may have been to follow the
early Washingtonian precept of using American power to protect our
economic
and commercial interests abroad. The fatidic events of September 11,
2001
threw Bush’s foreign policy into the arms of his “primacy cabal.”
Nation-building
The
problem with primacy is its incongruous assumptions. Take the
rediscovery
of nation-building. Nation-building implies nation-state which
carries
with it the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty implies
exclusive
jurisdiction over a population and territory and non-interference by
others
in the internal affairs of the sovereign. A sovereign state can be held
responsible for maintaining law and order within its territory when it
can fully exercise the prerogatives inherent in exclusive jurisdiction.
But as we saw earlier, nation-states are no longer coherent entities.
It
is ludicrous to assume that Indonesia is a coherent nation-state whose
law enforcement system can exercise impartial, uncorrupt and effective
jurisdiction over the various peoples and tribes inhabiting its 13,660
islands spread over nearly 2,000,000 square kilometers.
As
we saw earlier, a nation-state also needs the historic ingredients for
the concoction of a nation. If recent history is any guide,
nation-building
in pressure cookers hardly ever works. And with global technological
and
economic evolutions it is not even certain that maintaining
nation-states
would be practical. Nigeria, Congo, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Iraq
or Indonesia hardly compare in their “nationhood” with France, Germany
or Denmark. But even these latter European countries, which became
“nations”
in the slow cooking stew of history, are now watering down their
sovereign
rights in the context of the European Union to meet the
challenges
of the new global realities. Nation-building, therefore, is neither a
reasonable
nor a desirable goal. New global patterns have to be developed.
Regime change
Regime
change is another buzz word of primacy theory. What are the
criteria
for change? The argument advanced is to get rid of authoritarian
regimes
and promote democracy. Iraq is taken care of?! But what about Burma,
Sudan,
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, North Korea etc?
The
basic problem
in changing regimes in non-Western cultures into democracy is the
legitimacy
of the transfer of sovereignty. The United States was founded from the
start on the sovereignty of the people which from the grassroots passed
up to local, state and national authorities. In the Western evolutions
we referred to earlier, sovereignty of the monarchs trickled down in
successive
stages, more or less in parallel with the inculcation of national
identity
and national consciousness into the people. As democracy rather than
the
divine rights of kings became the method for legitimizing power into
authority,
the people went along with the outcome of national votes which
constituted
the means for the passage of their sovereignty to the government that
was
going to run their lives until the next elections.
That
“nation-state” consciousness of the people in the newly sovereign
states
of the non-Western world is, at best, superficial. The peoples of many
parts of the sovereign states do not associate with the “elected”
national
governments which, if not issue of their own particular tribe or
ethnicity
(usually represented by a strongman or a clique) is an alien power
imposing
itself on them.
The
“Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam” exist because the Tamil people do
not
consider the Sri Lankan sovereignty exercised out of Colombo as theirs
while the people of Nantes in France consider the French government in
Paris as legitimate. Even then, if one traveled farther West of Nantes
one may encounter a few claiming the liberation of Bretagne and to the
South those who seek autonomy for the Basques.
The
West – particularly
America – has attempted to export democracy to cultures where most
ethnicities
have been generally subordinated to an external power which they have
felt
as being out of their control but to which they have had to submit:
powers
like a kingdom, an empire, a theocracy or an ideology. Once the
concepts
of democracy and liberty were cast upon those cultures by the West and
grasped by the ethnicities which had not imbibed the idea of nationhood
in the sense of nation-state, they converted the idea of “national”
into
“ethnic” self-determination leading to demands for autonomy and
independence.
The Need for a Greater
Recognition
of New Actors
That
the fabric
of multi-ethnic unions can no longer be based solely on the model of
nation-states
with their exclusive jurisdiction and their coercive force maintaining
law and order, has since long been recognized and debated.[6]
There is little doubt that in the emerging world order particular
ethnic,
cultural and religious idiosyncrasies that clamor for autonomy should
be
recognized and brought together through secular overlapping
institutions
overarching them. Instead of nation-building we should promote
federalism:
federations of “estans.”
Before
venturing further into what may appear as an exotic proposition, it
should
be emphasized that what will be elaborated in the following pages is a
systematization of what is actually taking place within the global
human
dynamics. Global patterns along the lines of creating autonomous and
self-governing
entities, “estans,” proposed here are in fact taking place. The
European Union (EU), for example, has created the Regional Commission
which
links the different regions of its member states directly to the Union.
Member states of the EU such as France are making arrangements for more
direct election of representatives of the regions within their
territory
to the European Parliament. Recent devolutions in Great Britain have
transferred
greater autonomy to Scotland and Wales. In a Norwegian-brokered truce,
the government of Sri Lanka and the rebel “Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Ealam”
will become locked in peace by agreeing to have the World Bank, rather
than the Sri Lankan government, become the custodian, disburser and
auditor
of the international funds destined for the development of the
war-ravaged
island.
The
time has come to evaluate the merits of liberation movements and where
applicable, hold them responsible for the control they seek to
exercise.
In a peace accord between the Indonesian government and the Movement
for
a Free Aceh (GAM) signed under the auspices of Henri Dunant Center in
Geneva
in December 2002, the Indonesian army had agreed to withdraw and the
rebels
had agreed to deposit their arms at sites open to international
inspection.
The gain in recognition by the rebels and their appeasement was a
relief
for the four million inhabitants of Aceh and of great significance to
the
large Exxon Mobil natural gas operations in the area. Unfortunately the
rebels dragged their feet in handing in their arms. The Indonesian
government,
unwilling to relinquish its profitable sovereign control over the
resources
of the area, broke the truce and restarted the armed conflict which has
been going on for the past twenty five years. The U. S. government
expressed
concern about the Indonesian government’s decision to use force in the
Aceh province adding that the rebels and the government could have done
more to bridge their differences in the last meeting they had in Tokyo
in May 2003. But in line with its policy to uphold “nation-state”
sovereignty
discussed earlier, the United States government also emphasized that it
supports the Indonesian government’s insistence on that country’s
territorial
integrity. In this Aceh case we have a broad array of the currents at
work
in the new world order which should be systematically evaluated.
Indeed,
the evolution towards new patterns should be phased into favorable
international
circumstances and conjunctures as they arise. Greater autonomy can be
recognized
for different parts of a sovereign state in the context of
international
economic or cultural arrangements. For example, the Indonesian islands
of Batam and the Karimuns which are presently being developed by
Singapore,
could be granted special status. Nation-states, in their dealings with
one another and international organizations, should be prodded,
instigated
and encouraged to take advantage of the subsidiarity potentials of
their
own political components and relinquish power to “estans.” Thus, for
example,
the idea of subsidiarity, which Great Britain put forward in the
European
Union in order to retain the power of nation-states to implement EU
directives,
would be further transferred to Scotland, and Wales in the process of
devolution.
Indeed, the EU is presently the most propitious area for the
application
of the ideas presented in this essay.
There
will surely
be resistance on the part of central powers of the nation-state and
from
other quarters. Existing international organizations established on the
premise of sovereignty of nation-states, for example, may feel
threatened
for losing their client states; even though “estans” could easily
become
their new constituencies. Some potential “estans” may also be reluctant
to lose the political security and economic privileges they may have
with
their nation-states. It is, therefore, essential that the evolution
should
be gradual and ride on the on-going trends.
Estans, Federations,
Global Networks
and Institutions
Estan
The
term “estan” is coined here in order not to confuse the entities
discussed
here with nation-states, nor with their provinces and regions. If it
were
not confusing the term “province” would have been retained. But an
estan
may not coincide with established provinces. “Estan” is a derivative of
the Latin word esse which is the verb for being and is also at
the
origin of the concept of “state”. This particular derivative is adopted
in order to distinguish it from the state, and also because the concept
of “estan” is already present in geopolitical vocabulary: An estan may
coincide with a nation-state or it may not, such as Afghan(e)stan,
Turkmen(e)stan,
Kurd(e)stan, Kazakh(e)stan, or Baluch(e)stan. Note that while some of
the
entities listed are at present nation-states, others such as Kurdistan
or Baluchistan are not. Kurdistan overlaps Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey
and within itself is split between competing tribal leaders, while
Baluchistan
overlaps Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the same vein the Basque
estan
is a reality sitting astride France and Spain, etc. Afghanistan,
Turkmenistan,
or Kazakhstan, on the other hand, while being “nation-states,” have
within
them, “regions,” “provinces” some of which may aspire to be an estan
such
as Herat in Afghanistan.
Estans
will be members of overlapping regional arrangements, federations and
confederations,
some of which may have cultural, ethnic or religious dimensions.
Brittany,
for example, could be simultaneously part of a Celtic cultural
confederation,
an Atlantic fishing confederation, a North Western France agricultural
confederation and through the French government, part of an
inter-regional
policing and defensive military organization.
Estans
would thus be components of the broader complex of global human
dynamics.
Their potentials for cooperation with other entities depends on their
characteristics,
values, interests, and political economy and critical mass.
The
recognition of autonomy in terms of ethnic and cultural identity will,
of course, depend on the level of development of the estan and the
possibilities
of its integration into the global community.
Overarching Entities
Overlapping
entities are associations and arrangements the estans have purposely
created
or adhered to as well as regional and global bodies which extend their
activities and networks across different estans. The overarching
entities
will have different characteristics based on their interests and
values:
the goal of business corporations’ is to achieve big bottom lines while
religious groups seek the broadest base of converts.
By
“entities”
here we imply all organized groups which interact with other organized
groups across and within the estans.Under these criteria we come across
a broad spectrum of entities. At one end of the spectrum we could
include
terrorist groups and mafia; at the other end international
organizations,
multilateral corporations and public institutions. Note that to
underscore
the present government/market global dynamics, public and private
institutions
are purposely blurred. There are entities like governments and
inter-governmental
organizations identified by their legal mission and prerogatives, and
their
services or authorities such as law enforcement bodies.There are those
identified by the labor they provide – as a component of means of
production
– like the guilds of old and labor unions of today.
There are entities
whose identity is defined by their values such as humanitarian
non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and religious institutions which create identity
by
inculcating values and moral patterns of behavior. All these entities
have
the potential to overarch estans and incorporate them into regional and
global patterns.
The
possibilities for future arrangements and organization among estans
will
depend on how their compatibilities can be best put to use and their
differences
and conflicts overcome in the complex of their dynamics. Overarching
entities
such as regional organizations, federal institutions, multinational
corporations,
NGOs or labor unions can harness the estans’ energies for their own
benefit
and that of global economy. Of course, in the broader picture, the
compatibilities
and conflicts of the overarching entities also will have to be
addressed.
As we shall see later, overarching entities, depending on their
characteristics,
have potentials for cooperation, competition or conflict.
Economic
incentive may make Arabs and Jews, Moslems and Croats, Hutus and Tutsis
live together and the success of their cooperation may overshadow their
ethnic conflicts. Inversely, the collapse of economic incentives can
exacerbate
historical identity conflicts. Hutus and Tutsis coexisted, more or less
peacefully, as long as the price of coffee was high and their attention
was oriented towards gains in cultivating coffee. The collapse of the
price
of coffee on the world market in the 1990’s accentuated the Hutus/Tutsi
conflicts. Once ethnic conflicts flare up, their emotional impact
overshadows
potential material gains and handicaps the global economy, as is
presently
the case in a number of central African countries.
In
our earlier definition of overarching entities, terrorist groups and
mafia
were pitted against more legitimate institutions to emphasize the point
at which the relationships between peoples can break down. Even at the
terrorist extreme we may find that by seeking terror as its identity, a
group may not have as its ultimate goal the irrevocable disruption of
relations
between peoples, but be using it as a tool to achieve recognition for
eventual
negotiation of its claims – as do, for example, the Zapatistas in
Mexico
and the Palestine Liberation Organization in Israel. The mention of
terrorist
groups as entities underscores the extremes of conflict and use of
violence
in global human dynamics. A terrorist group is an entity which, while
claiming
identity, remains anonymous. It can, by the violence of its actions,
have
an impact on global human dynamics beyond what its mass warrants. It
may
engage in terrorist activities because it feels that it has received
less
than what is due to it. By doing so, it may lose all, or receive,
because
of its virulence, more than what is due to it.
We
have here a good assortment of the ingredients which generate global
human
dynamics: identity, mass and action of entities spanning tribes, social
and ethic segments, corporations, unions and religious institutions as
well as regional federal arrangements and global institutions.
The
warps and
wafts of overlapping entities may be more present in some estans and
less
in others. Mafia has a greater presence in Sicily than in Luxemburg,
while
re-insurance and banking conglomerates have a bigger presence in the
latter
than the former.
Responsibility,
not Sovereignty
Regional
arrangements
entered into by estans should correspond to some rationale: economic,
environmental,
geographic, cultural, linguistic, or other criteria.The law and order
sectors,
which the estans create or which overarch the estans, should also have
clear rationale in terms of security and effective and unbiased control.
Regional
federal and confederal settings and arrangements overarching the estans
for given purposes such as public works like dams, inter-regional
highways,
extraction of natural resources or industrial production will have
statutes
and institutions which may include secular norms sitting astride the
value
systems of the estans involved.
The
overarching security bodies may remain under the control of
nation-states.
But in many instances it would be preferable if they were replaced by a
regional police force composed of multi-national forces under the
auspices
of global or regional organizations like NATO. The nation-state will
have
vested interests which may not be compatible with those of particular
estans
or the global community. The Yugoslav army composed of Serbians was not
an impartial security force in Kosovo.
The
reason the U.S. has supported the Indonesian Army over the years,
besides
the Cold War syndrome of not letting Indonesia fall in the hands of the
communists, has been to have military control by proxy over a vast
spread
of thousands of islands inhabited by many different ethnic groups
laying
in a vulnerable and high risk maritime area straddling the Indian and
Pacific
oceans. Of course, it is also in the interests of the Jakarta oligarchy
to hold onto the Indonesian sovereignty for their own benefit and power
as was the case in East Timor and is now the case in Aceh. The
Indonesian
government will not easily relinquish its hold on the natural resources
of the territories it claims sovereignty over. The royalties they bring
in fill the coffers of the state and line the pockets of the officials.
Piracy in the straits of Indonesia is high partly because, at times, it
is done with the collusion of Indonesian Army posts. Regional
arrangements
which cap the autonomous ethnic entities should provide law and order
standards
which should be broader than the sovereign nation-state’s power and
exclusive
jurisdiction.
A
regional security organization in South East Asia similar to NATO could
relieve national armies which, in many cases, are not capable of
enforcing
law and order. A case in point is the trials and tribulations of the
Philippine
government on the island of Mindanao where the corrupt Moro National
Liberation
Front rules an autonomous region and where the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front is now believed to be running terrorist training camps.
In
many parts of the world where the nation-state is not capable of
securing
law and order, the multinational corporations have to choose between
the
alternatives of moving out, creating their own security forces, or
pursue
accommodation with the forces seeking autonomy. The latter alternative
puts multinational corporations in a position of complicity with rebel
organizations. For example, Tata Tea Company and other corporations in
Assam have provided help to Ulfa (United Liberation Front of Assam).
While
the local corporate manager makes arrangements with independence
seeking
people of an area, the corporate headquarters may support and negotiate
with the “national state” – which may be losing its grip on the social
developments in the area. Nation states collect taxes and royalties
from
corporations to maintain law and order to facilitate corporate
operations,
but in order to be competitive and attract corporate businesses they
reduce
taxes which finance social programs. So, an “ethnic entity” will have
the
nation state’s police and army on its back, but fewer and fewer social
programs – schools, hospitals, social security, unemployment insurance,
or retirement funds. Under these circumstances, the corporate local
manager
may sympathize with the “ethnic entity,” i.e., the potential
estan.
In that context, to affirm its own credibility, the potential estan
contesting
the sovereignty of the nation-state should assume responsibility for
maintaining
law and order.
Autonomy, not
Independence
Legitimization
of Power into Authority
While
in modern
Western cultures democracy through the ballot box is the preferred
method
for the legitimization of power into political authority, estans in
other
cultures may have other venues for creating their own political
leadership.
The Western concept of democracy itself has a wide variety. Democracy
is
only one of the processes for the legitimization of power into
authority.
It has been used by a limited number of nation-states in the West
during
the relatively short period of two and a half centuries of human
history.
The
regime of
an estan should correspond to its socio-political realities and its
position
in the global context. An estan with a secularly-educated population
which
has a realistic view of its own position within the global economic and
political context could, and probably should, have a democratic
processes
for the legitimization of power into political authority. But there are
estans whose political culture converts power into authority through
traditional,
monarchical or theocratic methods of legitimization.
It
may not be
realistic, reasonable or practical to force such estans to embrace
democracy
instead of their established political culture. It would be hard to
replace,
in a near future, the Sultanate of Burundi with a democratic republic.
In Kurdistan, chances are that whether through plebiscite or tribal
councils,
the Talabani clan will continue to control PUK (Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan)
and Barzani’s will control KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party). Assad’s son
ascended the presidential throne in Syria, Saddam was grooming his son
to step into his dictatorial shoes in Iraq. Aliyev hopes to have his
son
follow him in Azerbaijan, and Nazarbayev’s daughter is preparing for
power
in Kazakhstan. The Iranian Council of Guardians disqualifies candidates
who are not good Moslems. All these cultures have incorporated
democratic
electoral processes in their constitution, but whoever comes to power
does
so on tribal and clan intrigues.
Even American democracy itself is
conditioned
by plutocratic electoral funding to control the media for political
persuasion.
As the last presidential election revealed, American electoral system
has
its own legal quirks and the exercise of people’s sovereignty through
majority
vote does not always apply.
The
variety
of the processes for the legitimization of power into authority
underscores
the distance that should be put between the recognition of autonomy for
the estans and the old concept of exclusive jurisdiction and
independence
of sovereign nation-states. In many cases a hard core of militants
spearheads
an estan’s aspiration for autonomy. The global community and its
institutions
should see to it that the estan is not held captive and oppressed by a
clique of militants imposing their rule on the population without a due
legitimization processes corresponding to the political culture of its
people.
Democracy
may
come gradually as people become conscious of their rights – just as it
may go when people become too complacent and prone to the manipulations
of power.
Global Standards
It
would be
imperative for the global community to secure an encompassing set of
secular
principles by which the estans would be held to abide no matter what
their
political culture. The autonomy of an estan is not a value judgment. It
is the recognition and accommodation of a global political reality
which
should be subject to broader norms.[7]
Basic principles should cover such areas as respect for human rights,
checks
and balances securing judicial review against arbitrary or primitive
processes
of justice, recognition of rights of minorities and aliens, and
acceptance
of rules permitting intercourse among the members of the global
community
in the largest sense of the term whether economic, cultural,
environmental
or artistic.
There
may arise,
for example, instances where an estan’s choice of regime may have to be
influenced by the global community in order to accommodate global
imperatives.
Take, for example, an estan within whose territory lays an
international
waterway – a canal or a strait – indispensable for global navigation.
Now
suppose its population is overwhelmingly Moslem and votes into power a
fundamentalist regime which promulgates that no ship crossing the
waterway
should carry alcohol. The decision could seriously handicap global
navigation
and trade. It is obvious that the global community could not tolerate
such
an ethnic religious exigency.
With
new patterns
of global human dynamics, ethnic identities can pervade but take
different
forms and dynamics. Armenia, Israel, Bosnian Serpska Republic,
Chechnya,
Scotland or Bavaria are identifiable entities. Then there are ethnic
enclaves
within broader regional entities. There are Chinese in other south
Asian
regions and elsewhere. There are Lebanese in Argentina; Jews, Irish and
Arabs in America and elsewhere; Scots in England; Turks in Germany etc.
The diaspora of these ethnic identities develop global networks which
then
behave as overarching entities affecting different estans: Sikh
diaspora
in Canada, Russian diaspora in Brighton Beach etc.
The
states that
emerged in the early 1990’s as a consequence of the Soviet implosion
treated
the presence of the Russian diaspora on their territory differently.
Moldova
actually split, Estonia and Latvia disenfranchised a vast majority of
Russians
who had settled there during the Soviet rule, while many other states
made
arrangements for recognition and integration of ethnic Russians.[8]
The development of estans will provide ethnicities and cultures with
choices
within a spectrum ranging from exclusivity to accommodation, and
presenting
different opportunities and consequences both for the estans and the
minorities
residing within them. There is, however, a need for a minimum level of
cultural, ethnic and political tolerance, rule of non-sectarian laws
and
recognition of the rights of minorities to prevail within different
estans.
In
an interconnected
world where the rights of estans to autonomy are recognized, so should
be the rights of minorities to safeguard the characteristics of their
culture.
But the movement of people does not only erode the sovereignty of
nation-states,
it also dilutes traditional national identities of host cultures: The
ones
that Western nation-states cultivated over the centuries. America built
a nation by being a melting pot, but now prides itself as a tossed
salad.
"La culture civilisatrice française" took pride in taking
the people of other cultures into its bosom and integrating them into
its
own culture. It is now tolerating the mushrooming of mosques and
minarets
across the country.
The
advances
in communication technologies such as internet, satellite TV,
affordable
and mobile telephone connections and rapid transportation facilities
can
turn minority diaspora into active global networks operating within the
host culture.
Paradoxes may arise in balancing the rights of minorities
and maintaining the orderly cohesion of the estan. A driver’s license
in
America is a photo identification document. The picture of a veiled
Moslem
female on it defeats the purpose – as is presently being debated in
court
in Florida – until establishing identity by scanning the eye iris has
become
a common technique. In fact, some states in America still have laws on
their books which prohibit covering the face in public. They date back
from nineteenth century days of bank robbery – which can now be
replaced
with terrorism. It is imperative that in the intercourse of peoples of
estans and cultures the secular logic of underlying principles of
conduct
prevails.
Estan Problematic
To
participate
in the global economy as a distinct entity, an estan needs to have a
critical
mass. Estans which are not economically viable to stand on their own
may
need to combine their efforts with neighboring ethnicities. But
neighboring
ethnicities are usually "ethnicities" because they have created their
identities
in contra-distinction to their neighbors. And usually there is
competition
and often times hostility between them. The problem of broad global
organization
is the discrepancy that exists between the big picture and its details.
Looking
at the broad picture of an area with peoples having similar social,
ethnic,
linguistic, religious, and cultural patterns – such as the Middle East,
the Balkans or South East Asia – one may be inclined to assume that the
area can be organized as an identifiable coherent entity. However, upon
closer scrutiny of different ethnicities on the terrain, one would
realize
that while the neighboring ethnicities may have most of their traits in
common, their source of identity is the differences that exist between
them, making them each feel unique and antagonistic to their neighbors.
They would rather associate themselves with a broader overarching
entity
than being confused with their neighbors and lose their specific
identity.
That is partly the reason bigger entities like empires have emerged by
using the conflicts among neighboring entities to pide and rule.
Overarching
powers have then served as arbiters and controllers to keep the
neighboring
entities in peace, working together and complementing each other. The
overarching
controls may have developed the estans, but their main purpose would
have
been the exploitation of the estans for the benefit of the controlling
classes in the nation or the empire – Roman milites, Chinese
Mandarins,
or Western aristocracy and bourgeoisie. The checks and balances
proposed
in the next section are intended to enhance the organizational
characteristics
of present day overarching entities while controlling their exploitive
potentials.
Reviewing
the burgeoning estans we come across political cultures which are not
palatable
by Western standards. In some, the “weightier parts” with traditional
roots,
may have to be endured; in others, with dubious moral standards, they
need
to be challenged. Take, for instance, the Serpska Republic, one of the
three ethnic regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, under the nose of
NATO
forces, mafia businesses controlled by the war criminal Karadzic
smuggle
gas and cigarettes and pay the police. In Afghanistan, Ismail Khan, the
warlord of Herat, cashes customs revenues of the trade with Iran,
negotiates
with oil companies and is tolerated and at times cajoled by the United
States military forces. Other burgeoning estans referred to elsewhere
in
this paper also have different degrees of palatable characteristics.
Depending
on the dynamics of their political culture, estans will have different
kinds and degrees of involvement with different regional and global
networks.
While some restrictive aspects of an estan’s exercise of autonomy,
although
not appealing in terms of the broad standards of global community, will
have to be tolerated, others may have to be subjected to global
pressure
for change. For instance, an estan may require its educational programs
to be taught in its ethnic language. By doing so, however, it may
handicap
its own population more than the global community because it reduces
the
chances of its educated population to get involved in the broader
regional
and global activities. The objection of an estan to the construction of
a super-highway through its territory, however, may jeopardize broader
regional and global interests and require the intervention of
overarching
bodies. The solution may lay in old-fashioned political arm-twisting or
private enterprise incentives.
In
many cases the private venue may prove to be more effective, as
witnessed
by corporate penetrations into underdeveloped areas. Private enterprise
has the flexibility to entertain rather than coerce the leaders of an
estan.
That entertainment – read corruption – may not be in the best interest
of the estan as a whole but it benefits the broader regional and global
patterns. In the process leaders of the estan may be co-opted into a
global
class different from their own ethnic identity. Their co-option into
broader
global circles may ease the functional incorporation of their estan
into
the global human dynamics.
In
the exercise of their autonomy estans will face limitations which they
will be able to overcome by involvement in regional and global
arrangements;
but which can also make them vulnerable and captive to other entities.
Certain functions need resources which the ethnic community may not be
able to muster. The path of the cattle to the pasture is made by the
cattle.
It can be graveled for communication between two communities; but the
paved
road between two estans and beyond will need a larger organization,
material
means and financial resources. They may not be available or not
cost-effective
at the community level. Once the entities have collaborated to create
the
organization which can pave the inter-estan road, it may also, if need
be, asphalt the roads within the communities which otherwise would have
remained gravel roads. For creating super-highways and connecting a
number
of entities yet heavier equipment, more financial resources and complex
organization will be needed, requiring the cooperation of a number of
estans
at the regional level.
The
same process applies to other needs. It is not at the level of an
ethnic
community that complex research can be undertaken for the improvement
of
crops which may require expensive and extensive research labs. Thus
education,
at the ethnic level should prepare the members of the community not
only
for communal but broader social participation. Estans and overarching
entities
will have to cooperate to create educational systems which fit broader
patterns of learning and research. The question that arises is how does
this fit into the domain of rights and responsibilities of the
inpiduals,
the community and the society.
At
the developed
stage of Western “nation-state” model democracy, human rights and the
rule
of law required the state to assume certain responsibilities to
facilitate
the exercise of the "democratic" rights of the citizens. To be able to
exercise the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, the citizen
had to be provided with the means to do so. That implied the
development
of unbiased education – for the development of thought – and means of
communication
and transportation – to make freedom of expression and assembly a
reality.
If a community within the “nation-state” was isolated and it was not
economically
cost effective for the private enterprise to provide for that community
adequate schools, communication lines and transportation, then the
government,
depending on the regime, was to either provide that community with
those
means for the exercise of the democratic rights, or regulate private
enterprise
in a manner to "oblige" it to make those means available.
As
mentioned
earlier, with the spread of market economy and the challenges of
globalization,
nation-states reduce taxes and dismantle, not only public works and
services
for the exercise of democracy, but also public social programs covering
education, health care, unemployment and living standards. As estans
gain
more autonomy they will face the problem of providing those public
services
and social programs. In a broad spectrum of alternatives, they may rely
on tribal, local and communal arrangements, devise and enter into
federal
regional plans or call on overarching corporate networks such as global
insurance providers or growing educational institutions. The choices
made
by estans from one end of the spectrum to the other, will make them
less
or more dependent on overarching entities, but also render their people
more provincial or more cosmopolitan.
The
emergence of Islam as a world power is a phenomenon which needs to be
observed.
It provides religious precepts for broad social security schemes. From
the grassroots up, its programs are replacing national schemes and
while
operating at local and communal levels, are engulfing ethnic and
national
identities into the Islamic hegemony. The question that arises is the
compatibility
of Islamic faith with the principles of freedom of thought, democracy
and
the need for global secular frameworks to ensure the autonomy of
different
cultures.
Global Standards for
Overarching
Bodies
References
made
so far to the overlapping networks and institutions, whether the
creation
of a NATO type regional organization for security and fighting
terrorism,
the collusion of multinational corporations with freedom fighters, or
the
need for mechanisms to monitor the adherence of estans to global
standards
of behavior, point to the need for adoption, adaptation and
transformation
of new and old arrangements and institutions. Like the realities of the
emergence of estans, the process of change in global institutions is
under
way, but needs systematization.
Mention
was made,
for example, of the involvement of the World Bank as custodian of
development
funds in the Sri Lanka/Tamil conflict or the efforts by Henri Dunant
Center
to mediate in the Aceh conflict. Note that here again, for our
purposes,
private and public domains are blurred. The World Bank is an
intergovernmental
organization while Henri Dunant Center is a non-governmental
organization.
As the concept of sovereignty is diluted, markets and governments
merge.
Estans or their regional federations would be shareholders in
multinational
corporations or they could be engaged in public projects assigned to
multinational
corporations. Example: Eurostar was conceived by the governments of
France
and Great Britain (which in our present perspective could be likened to
regional federations of estans); and is a publicly traded multinational
corporation run by one publicly owned French and one privately owned
British
railway corporation.
It
is assumed that estans will have more or less oversight over the
overarching
federal institutions which they have created or agreed to join for
their
common needs. But bodies such as corporations and NGOs which grow in
some
parts of the globe and extend their activities to estans in other parts
may escape global oversight.
NGOs
have emerged
to represent and speak on behalf of global public opinion – a vacuum
which
is hard to fill coherently indeed. While NGOs should be lauded for
filling
the vacuum, their impact on the course of global affairs may become
disproportionate
to their mandate. This may lead to abuse of power and corrupt use of
funds.
NGOs publicly intimidating solicitations may turn into taxation without
representation. To remedy such possible abuses one could conceive of a
Global NGO Council which would assume self-censorship while being
monitored
by other global public and private organizations.
Broadly,
there
is need for developing global bodies to oversee the activities of
overarching
networks and organizations. In their dealings with estans,
multinational
corporations may attempt oligopolies and monopolies or promote lopsided
projects detrimental to the interests of estans. A Global Corporate
Council
could be envisaged to provide oversight to corporate sectors and
associations,
imposing on them self-censorship, monitored by NGOs and other public
and
private institutions.
The
remedy for
faith based violence and terrorism could be a Global Ecumenical Council
of different faiths. In short, there is need to guard the guardians.
Application
of International Accounting System (IAS) standards should be required
for
all private and public, regional and global organizations.
Globalization
of Natural Resources
And
finally,
even though there is nothing more futile than an idea whose time has
not
come, my old chimera for the globalization of natural resources which I
presented to this forum over twenty years ago.[9]
As Jean Jacques Rousseau said “the earth belongs to no one, and the
fruits
thereof to those who cultivate them.” The natural resources of the
world
belong to all mankind, not to those who sit on them. The creation of
Iraq
Oil Fund by the UN resolution in May 2003 will drastically reduce the
Kurds’
lucrative source of income. The oil of Kurdistan will now benefit all
Iraqi
people including Sunni and Shi'a Arabs. Why should the Kurds claim
ownership?
And why are only the Iraqi people entitled to the benefits? Why not
also
the people of Jordan, which has no oil? After all, before the British
concocted
modern Iraq, they were all provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Iraq is
indeed
presently a good testing ground for the creation of the estans of
Kurds,
Sunni and Shi'a Arabs.
There
is no
reason for the ruling classes of Brunei, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf
states
to live in opulence in a world where half of humanity lives on less
than
two dollars a day. The natural resources of the world should be put
under
a global regime and entrusted to a globally instituted body which would
solicit offers for their exploitation. Contracts would be granted to
the
best bidders with due respect to efficiency, environmental protection
and
human rights considerations monitored by NGOs. The royalties received
would
fund global development programs planned and administered by other
institutions
with due checks and balances. There will surely be bureaucracy, waste
and
injustice in the process, but not as much as there is now. Admittedly,
there is little hope for the realization of this idea. It assumes
long-term
vision of global development by those who claim and exercise
sovereignty.[10]
Conclusion
This
essay was
undertaken as a reflection on the present hegemonic United States
foreign
policy. It addresses some of the major concerns of the U. S. foreign
policy
such as combating terrorism, reducing the proliferation of weapons of
mass
destruction or the opening of world markets. It is argued here that
those
goals can be better achieved if, instead of the present policies of
upholding
the integrity of nation-states and attempting to change their regimes
into
democracies, the U. S. foreign policy was oriented towards recognizing
the aspirations of different peoples for autonomy and their
incorporation
in overarching federal arrangements and global networks.
In
doing so the
U.S. may, of course, look at the process of fragmentation of the world
into estans from the vantage point of U.S. foreign policy and national
interests and assume that the U.S. itself will remain intact as a super
power. But the U.S. could also envisage the world order of estans
overarched
by regional confederations and global institutions as eventually
encompassing
the United States. In fact, the U. S. has the ingredients for such a
prospect
already in place. Indeed, to some extent, what already exists in the
U.S.
can serve as model for the proposed world order of estans. The states
in
the United States could be conceived as estans which are presently
overarched
by different overlapping regional federal arrangements. The Federal
district
courts overarch the states but do not coincide with the Federal Reserve
districts. The Department of Agriculture has different districts than
FCC,
Federal Civil Aviation or Department of Education. In the global
context,
the central role and the tax-collecting prerogatives of the U.S.
federal
government would devolve to particular federal regions and institutions
assigned with different tasks. A prospect which goes along with the
Republican
dominated Congress’s idea of giving power back to the states.
Granted,
just like all other world orders, the one which is unfolding now will
be
complex and messy. Too much pragmatism, expediency and simplification
on
the part of U.S. foreign policy makers may, in fact, contribute to
additional
future mess and complications. Our policy makers would be well advised
to observe the time series of past empires. Instead of the present
policy
of forming coalitions as needs arise and bilateral agreements with
sovereign
states, and instead of the disdain for United Nations and international
law as reflected in the invasion of Iraq and the incarceration of
Afghan
Taliban fighters in Guantanamo Bay, the U. S. should fully participate
in multinational organizations and lay the grounds for lasting
international
legal norms with adequate checks and balances and enforcement
mechanisms.
The
study of past empires shows that no empire succeeded to eternalize its primacy.
Empires which survived longest after their decline were those which
left
behind their legacy. The Roman Empire metamorphosed on and on,
and
its Roman Law is still with us. The freedom of the high seas evolved,
to
a large extent, with the expansion of the Dutch and British empires and
permitted them to survive as prosperous societies past their imperial
adventures.
© Anoush
Khoshkish
Akim
Inc., New York, July 2003
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