Chapter 1


As I leaned back in my chair pondering where to begin this essay on global human dynamics, I realized that the beef I had consumed that day -- by then well integrated within my organism -- was a produce of Argentina, the banana I had eaten was imported from Costa Rica and the coffee I had drunk was grown in Nigeria.  Global human dynamics nurtured my body which, incidentally, was covered by a sweater produced in England out of Australian wool and a pair of jeans made in U.S.A. by migrant workers from Mexico.

I reached for my Sony radio, made in Japan, to fine tune the Mozart concerto and realized that global human dynamics, while reaching within me, span beyond my reach over continents. By the way, the concerto was being transmitted from Salzburg by satellite. These and variations on the theme are common occurrences. Yet, if we don't make a conscious effort, we donut become aware of them.  Consciousness about them, however, has become a matter of survival.  The emission from the satellite may not have been pleasurable music, but lethal laser.

Of course, intercourse among peoples living in different regions is not new.  The inhabitants of Mohenjo-Daro in the Punjab valley used pots and pans produced by Sumerians in Mesopotamia before recorded history.  What is new is the magnitude of modern global human relations.  And what is ominous about it is the gap between the development of the means of contact and communication and yet the relative lack of understanding and concord among the peoples of the world.  Man's technology has left his understanding behind. [1]

Over a span of some 2,300 years, from Darius to Napoleon, man travelled at about the same maximum speed: that of a horse on a well paved road.  Then, within some 200 years, man increased his speed of travel by nearly a hundred times.  It took William of Rubroeck, the envoy of  St. Louis of France to the court of the Great Khan of China, almost a year (1253) to reach Beijing.  As he travelled, each day he came in contact with cultural variations understandable in their similarity or juxtaposition to the ones he had encountered the day before.  Today, the traveller can get from any point on earth to any other in less than a day.  Yet, it is not only the vision of a planeload of American Midwestern farmers let loose in Dacca that should strike us as a dramatic illustration of the shrinking earth, but rather the round-the-clock, round-the-globe computer linkups and transactions and at the same time the five minute lapse between the triggering of a nuclear missile from a submarine and its impact on the target.

Still, dramatic as these illustrations may be, they seem more manageable and negotiable than the simmering and globally intertwined problems which no longer neatly fit the classical patterns of power politics among sovereign nation-states.

The world population is growing on target to pass the six billion mark sometime around the turn of the century.  And that population is particularly growing in regions where problems of survival whether of sustenance or social and political security are far from resolved.  In 1987 the richest 20% of the world population produced 74% of the world GNP while the poorest 20% generated only 1.5% of it; and the poorest 60% of the world population held just over 7% of the global wealth [2]

At the same time the poorer population of the world owes the richer over one trillion dollars.  A debt which has run up because the developing countries want to catch up with the industrialized countries. Much of that money has been mismanaged or taken out of the developing countries by their leaders and put back in Western banks. The developing countries’ handicap is further compounded by protectionist measures and nationalist constraints in the affluent markets as well as the absence of adequate international organizational frameworks.

But if by the turn of the century all the six billion human beings developed economies like those of the West with comparable per capita car ratios, used the same amounts of fuel and energy and produced similar amounts of non-degradable pollutants, we will have much bigger holes in the ozone layers of the earth, bigger oil spills, more dangerous nuclear radiation, and probably long-lasting greenhouse effects and environmental hazards putting the planet in jeopardy.  Surely, human ingenuity must be able to find ways of reaping the benefits of knowledge, science and technology to bring comfort and happiness to the multitude and avoid the noxious side effects.  But all human ingenuity does not seem to be going in that direction.  Consider the annual 500 billion dollar drug trafficking business where drug producers and traffickers run international networks and launder their fortunes with impunity into the world economic system; international terrorism where terrorists take hostages and force governments to bargain for them; and belief patterns which promote superstition and fanaticism gaining grounds over rational behaviour and secular human and social structures.[3]

These developments do not squarely fit into the patterns of the discipline we have come to know as international relations. Mainly because what we refer to as international relations is in fact focused on inter-nation-state power politics.  As new phenomena have emerged since World War II, the discipline has attempted to incorporate them into the patchwork of its original quilt.   But its original quilt, borrowed from the diplomatic history and international legal structures of modern Western cultures, has set the discipline into a mould in time and space with limited flexibility to absorb the new phenomena. A quick look at its roots will make the point.[4]

The outer confines of the discipline are traced in post-Reformation Europe and the emergence of sovereign states at the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia (1648).  The more recent antecedents of the discipline are in the post-Napoleonic Europe. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the states of Europe created an international order based on the concept of sovereignty which corresponded well enough to the realities of the time to even survive and absorb the revolutions of nationalities in Europe of 1848.  The revolutions of 1848 inserted into the international order -- albeit with a twist -- another long strain of Western civilization: that of the legacies of the British, American and French national Revolutions, namely, the concept of “nationhood”.  By the middle of the Nineteenth century, the nation-state became the recognized actor on the international scene.  The twist was that nationalism, which as the fuel of revolutions had upheld the dignity of man against the absolutism of the state, evolved to become the source of its exaltation: from Locke, Rousseau and Patrick Henry to Napoleon, Hegel and Mussolini.

Together with their firepower, administrative organization, industrial backbone and civilized and Christian righteousness, Western powers, while balancing each other's power, imposed their politico-legal concept of sovereign nation-state on other cultures.  It was in this politico-legal context, for example, that the Berlin Conference on African Affairs of 1884 laid down rules for the appropriation of Africa by European powers.

As the European nation-states’ power potentials increased, the balancing act became more and more precarious.  Attempts at accommodation among the sovereign nation-states to control themselves from encroaching on each other, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and international arbitration courts, did not produce adequate international frameworks and eventually the nation-states burst out of their seams into the First World War.
At the end of that war some events such as the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the drift of the “older” nation-states - the democracies - towards internationalism seemed to have potentials to erode the notion of nation-state.  But Wilson's Fourteen Points and the principle of self-determination - eventually adapted to the political interests of European powers - gave new vigour to the concept of nation-state and cajoled the nascent discipline of international relations in that direction. Nationalism proved virulent in the “newer” nation-states of Europe such as Germany and Italy.  It also fuelled the aspirations of the non-western cultures, many of which, paradoxically, became conscious of their “nationhood” through the ideological bias of the Bolshevik Revolution.[5]

Nation-state power politics was already showing signs of inadequacy as a focus for the discipline of international relations.  The development of ideological dimension across nation-state configurations did not properly fit in, and indeed, disturbed the domains of the international jurists, diplomats and strategists.  Nevertheless, the concept of nation-state survived and at the close of the Second World War inspired the makers of the United Nations to conceive of a world order built on a hierarchy of nation-states and a new concert of powers: the co-operation and management of world affairs by the five Permanent Members of the United Nations’ Security Council.  Its provisions for self-government produced such incongruous nation-states as Fiji, composed of opposing Hindu and native populations, Burundi, where a Tutsi minority rules the Hutu population, or the sovereign state of Nauru with 20 square miles of territory and 8,000 inhabitants, while 20 million Kurds and 6 million Tibetans with more or less defined territories still fight to have their own nation-state with no prospects in sight.

Different international developments since the end of the Second World War have influenced both the structure and the methodology of the international relations discipline.  The collapse of the new “concert of nations”, the cold war, the coalition of the non-aligned nations, the emergence of People's Republic of China and the re-emergence of Europe as a power beyond her particular nation-states have inspired international relations theories such as bipolarity, multipolarity, core and periphery, linkage, regimes and hegemony.[6]

The discipline has adopted the methods of other social sciences using behavioural and quantitative approaches, simulation and systems analysis, studying political cultures and psychology, political economy and sociology of international relations. [7] But the sovereign nation-state power politics has remained its albatross.

Many recognized the need for a broader approach for the understanding of international phenomena and tried to move the focus off nation-states and onto other actors.  But they were eventually impressed by the resilience and staying power of sovereign nation-states.[8]

The most serious recent attempts at extending the study of international relations beyond the straight jacket of sovereignty have been made in the context of  “transnational” approaches, recognizing the existence of other actors on the international scene, from the catholic church and Ford Foundation to international migration.[9]

However, these actors, as they emerge from within the guts of the body-politick and steal the limelight from the nation-states, muddle the plot which is still assumed to be that of power play acting among the sovereigns.  The discipline thus has remained, as some had suggested, a perspective on a “bundle of subjects” and a “basket” appearing as a hodge-podge to the uninitiated. [10]   Yet, international relations need not remain a non-discipline.  But, in order to have a discipline, the student of international relations needs to be able to analyse the contents of the bundle and the basket and bring them into a coherent and comprehensive pattern rather than constantly changing the contents of the basket.

*  *  *

It is for that purpose that I propose a change of focus from the Actors onto the Factors of global human dynamics - international relations. I believe that by first taking apart the wefts and woofs of what we called a quilt and then weaving them into a new colourful fabric, we may come up with a pattern bearing the blueprint for a new foundation.  That foundation could serve not only as a base for the understanding of power politics among nation-states but also for the analysis of the other patterns of the global flux which influence the inter-nation-state power politics and transcend them.

There will always be human entities which may be called Irish and Welsh, Azerbaijani and Armenian, Hutu and Tutsi, or Lao and Mong; there will be religious and ideological configurations and there will be global financial networks laundering drug money, exploiting cheap labour, producing goods, creating jobs and helping development. In the course of history, these entities have clashed and co-operated with each other.  Have their "encounters" had common characteristics?  Have there been “factors” which have made encounters possible and then turned them into conflict or co-operation?  Are there common threads for these factors within the different encountering entities?  To ponder these questions we need to look at the nature and evolution of these entities in the context of their encounters.

Delving into pre-Reformation and post-United Nations worlds as the two historic confines of "sovereign nation-state power -politics", we find entities with differing identities whose dynamics of encounter, when considered in a continuum with those of sovereign states, may help us attempt a unified field theory for the discipline.  After all, within the Holy Roman Empire, the “sovereign” was God.  That did not prevent the actors on the international scene from playing power politics which they did not formulate as exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty.  It was only after the Reformation that legal sovereignty passed from God to the Christian monarchs of Europe under natural law.  To be sure, sovereignty was a powerful component of European monarchs’ identity.  But it was not their invention.  Earlier, Christianity and Islam had held sway over vast territories for centuries under the power of God's sovereignty.  Sovereignty, crucial as it was, was not the only component of a politically independent group's identity.  The other cultures the European powers came in contact with had identities of their own, and were it not for the other factors in their dynamics of encounter such as Europe's superior firepower and methods of production, organization and communication, other cultures may have prevailed and international relations may have been based not on the sovereignty of nation-states, but on the gods of the Aztecs or the tribal traditions of the Cherokee.

As for the post-United Nations world, the notion of nation-state sovereignty, defined as exclusive jurisdiction within a recognized territory over a specific population -- identified as “nationals”, whether of the same or diversified stocks -- appears even more debatable.  The Third World nation-states are scrambling to materialize “nationalism” -- the two terms (nation-state and nationalism) not always coinciding: Ethiopia challenged by Eritrea and Tigre, Morocco by Polisarios, India by the Sikhs and others, Sri Lanka by the Tamils, Iran, Iraq and Turkey by the Kurds, China by Tibetans, Burma by Karen, Afghanistan by the Mujahedin etc.; and Lebanon tearing herself apart.

The “identity” map of Africa does not look like its political map at all -- see map in Chapter 2.  Nor does, for that matter, that of Europe drawn along such identities as Basques, Tyrolians, Jurasians, Catalans, Bohemians, Bretons or Bavarians.  Indeed, “nations” within politically well established “sovereign nation-states” are claiming their independence. Scotland, for example, toys with the idea of membership in the Europe of 1992 bypassing her association with the United Kingdom. Surely some of the other European “nations” mentioned above entertain similar ideas.  In anticipation of the European Community's further economic integration proposals are made for regional regroupings cutting across national frontiers for areas with similar economic patterns to harmonies their excise tax rates  “Opening up the Tax Frontiers”, Brussels, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Roundtable of European Industrialists, 1988.

In Eastern Europe “nations” within the Soviet Union such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia are challenging USSR's sovereignty. Religion has re-emerged as a potent dimension of international relations superseding national frontiers and imposing its laws on accepted rules of international conduct: The Vatican playing an important role in the internal affairs of Poland and catholic church reinstated in that country, Islamic fundamentalism disregarding diplomatic conventions and inspiring international terrorism.

Ideological conflicts, which divided the industrialized capitalist and socialist camps and led to regional and supra-national arrangements like EC, the NATO, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, after their cruder forms of cold war confrontations, are now manifesting themselves in subtler ideas of trade-unionism, human rights, democracy, worker co-management and free enterprise, cutting across earlier international ideological divides.

International finance has grown as an influential dimension of international relations to the extent that sovereign states constituting major economic powers, even in concert, cannot control global exchange rate fluctuations.  Multinational conglomerates have branched out in international networks of capital, production, marketing, distribution and communications in proportions no longer easily controllable or serviceable by any one nation-state. For example, in the naval expedition to the Persian Gulf in 1987-88 to protect the international shipping lanes in the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. Navy was in the embarrassing position of protecting Kuwaiti tankers flying United States flag and reluctant to defend ships belonging to American corporations which were registered offshore to evade U.S. taxes.  In Angola, in the Eighties, the Cuban troops protected American oil companies against attacks by the rebel Unita forces that were supported by the U.S. government.  Risk-taking egos are no longer generals in battlefields but take-over raiders in corporate boardrooms.

The framework of sovereign nation-state no longer suffices to embrace the “Sovereign State of ITT,” the Medellin drug cartel or the hostage holders of Beirut.  Diplomats and soldiers do not seem to be the simple answer.[11] Rather than beginning international relations with them, we need to devise a complex of which they are a part. Such a complex can be devised if we begin our research at the beginning by searching for the factors which affect and make encounter and intercourse of human entities with differing and specific identities possible. Stanley Hoffmann judiciously opens his Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics by identifying the field as “patterns of conflict and cooperation among mutually alien actors,” but a few lines later he reduces it to “a world of sovereign states.” [12]  It is a beginning which could qualify international relations as a distinct discipline within the social sciences.

Indeed, such an approach could provide valuable insights for other disciplines.   For example, while political science assumes the existence of legal and governmental structures and sociology and social psychology deal with interactions between human beings within the social context, in international relations we look at man at the confines of organized society.  Within the group, social experiences accumulate exponentially and frequent observations of actions and their consequences among the multitude soon result in “do’s and don’ts”: moral, ethical and legal norms passed on from one generation to another.  Encounters of the entity with aliens at its confines are not normally an integral part of its members’ life experience -- unless, of course, an individual is in the particular position of being directly involved in them.  The child, while being inculcated with the norms of behaviour within the group, including “thou shall not kill”, may also observe the rejoicing at the news of heavy casualties inflicted by the warriors of the group on the aliens.

To the extent they retain their distinctiveness, human entities --“nations,” cultures, ethnicities, tribes -- do not readily submit to binding norms which would alleviate the causes and consequences of conflict with other entities and do not easily internalize whatever modi vivendi may have developed in their encounters.  The phenomenon is more glaringly demonstrable at moments of break with the past, when human entities revert to a more primitive mode of behaviour towards the alien, be it, among the bigger pictures, Hitler's Nazism, the Thirty Years War, the Spanish colonization of America, the Mongolian invasions or the expansion of Islam, or, among the smaller pictures, the daily headlines in the newspapers about the warring tribes around the world.

But the reader can probably best observe the phenomenon by introspection. To paraphrase Santayana, “those who do not internalize history are bound to repeat its mistakes!”  The uniqueness of a study of the essentials of global human dynamics resides in the paradox in our paraphrase: one hardly "internalizes" history.  That is probably why in our memory history is most often recalled as a fabric wherein the relative time-span is not properly perceived.  What was the time-span between Hamurabi and Augustus? Seventeen centuries.  The pyramids of Egypt had been built for two thousand years before the first stones of Persepolis were laid.  This common flatness of history in our perception reduces its impact as an analytical tool. It has led some to assume that history beyond modern times has become irrelevant to the understanding of international affairs.[13]

A closer look at historical events, archaeological sites and museum artefacts shows us the immutable characteristics of human encounters and leads us to believe that plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.  Except for the fact that because of modern technology, the sequence of events in certain areas are accelerated and people are more often in contact others who are not part of their tribe. At the slower pace of communications, remoteness compensated for proximity of events.  As Racine put it:  “L’éloignement des pays répare en quelque sorte la trop grande proximité des temps: car le peuple ne met guère de différence entre ce qui est, si j’ose ainsi parler, … mille ans de lui, et ce qui en est … mille lieues”.[14] That makes the observation of human behaviour at the point of encounter of alien entities when events took place at a slower pace even more imperative and valuable for our study of global intercourse.

It may be argued that, the reason we do not internalize history is because, compared to the frequency of social experiences within human entities, there have not been enough: “time series” of encounter and intercourse between them to permit the development and internalization of inter-group norms of conduct. After all, over 99% of man's existence is in prehistory and sparse bands of hunters and gatherers.  The argument, however, does not take into account the quantum leap between man's need for affectional belonging and identification within his own culture and the surge of his primeval instincts as part of a group at its confines.[15]   And that does not seem to have changed from the time of the encounter between the Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons to the warring factions in the Congo.  It is at the confines of his tribo-cultural entity where we have to meet man in the next chapter and examine the factors which materialize and shape his entity's encounter with other entities.

A. Khoshkish
London School of Economics
October 1989

[1] “Man”, “he” or “his” when used in the generic sense in this essay shall refer to the human species:  man, woman and child.
[2] Ruth Leger Sivard: World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987-88 Edition, Washington, World Priorities, 1988.
[3] According to Fortune Magazine, June 20, 1988, the global drug trade may run up to $500 billion a year, more than twice the value of all U.S. currency in circulation. p. 27.
[4] Wright, Quincy, The Study of International Relations, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, p.33.
[5] See, for example, Sun Yat-Sen’s Message to Soviet Union, The New York Times, May 24, 1925; Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom, New York, John Day, 1941, pp. 229 et seq. Originally published in 1936 in England; Ho Chi Minh, “The Path to Leninism,” in his Selected Works, Vol. IX, pp. 448-50, Hanoi, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960-62, and Maozedong, The Politics and Culture of New Democracy,  January 15, 1941, notably section XV.]
[6] On polarity see, for example, Deutsch, Karl W. and J. David Singer “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” in World Politics, XVI, 3, April 1964, pp. 390-406, Waltz, Kenneth, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” in Daedalus, XLIII, 3, 1964, pp. 881-909, and his Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley, 1979; on Core and periphery see Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World System, New York, Academic Press, 1974, 1980; on core and periphery see Friedmann, John “A General Theory of Polarized Development,” in Niles M. Hanson (ed.) Growth Centers in Regional Economic Development, New York, Free Press, 1972; on linkage see Sondermann, Fred A. “The Linkage Between Foreign Policy and International Politics,”  in James N. Rosenau (ed.)  International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York, The Free Press, 1961, pp. 8-17 and Rosenau, James N., Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, New York, The Free Press, 1969; on regimes and Hegemony see Krasner, Stephen (ed.), the International Organization issue on “International Regimes,” Spring 1962;  --(ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983; Keohane Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1977, p.19, Modelski, George, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and Nation-State,” in Comparative Studies in Society and History, XX,2, April 1978, pp. 214-38, and his “Long Cycles and Strategy of U.S. International Economic Policy,” in William P. Avery and David P. Rapkin (eds), America in a Changing World Economy, New York, Longman, 1982,  Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981; Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984. The idea of hegemony is, of course, older than its more recent discovery, see, for example, Triepel, Heinrich, Die Hegemonie; ein Buch von fuehrenden Staaten, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1938.]
[7] See, for example, the pioneering work of Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Politics, New York, Wiley, 1957, --  “Systems Theory,” in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis, New York, The Free Press, 1967, pp. 150-163, -- “The Systems Approach to International Politics,” in Morton A. Kaplan, New Approaches to International Relations, New York, St. Martin’s, 1968; Knorr, Klaus, and Sidney Verba (eds) The International System: Theoretical Essays, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, McClelland, Charles A. “System Theory and Human Conflict,” in Elton B. McNeil (ed.) The Nature of Human Conflict, Englewood Cliff, Princeton Hall, 1965, -- Theory and International System, New York, Macmillan, 1966; Young, Oran B., A Systematic Approach to International politics, Research Monograph 33, Center of International Studies, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968;  Rosenau, James N., (ed.) In Search of Global Patterns, New York, The Free Press,1976; International Studies Quarterly, special issue on” International Crisis: Progress and Prospects for Applied Forecasting and Management,” XXI,1, March 1977; Kelman, Herbert C. (ed.), International Behavior: A Socio-Psychological Analysis, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965; Banks, Michael, “Two Meanings of Theory in the Study of International Relations,” in Yearbook of World Affairs, London, Stevens & Sons, 1966; Knorr, Klaus, and James N. Rosenau (eds), Contending Approaches to International Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969; Rosenau, James N., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York, The Free Press, 1971;  Shelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict, New York, Oxford University Press, 1963; Snyder, Glenn H., “’Prisoner's Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’ Models in International Politics,” in International Studies Quarterly, XV, March 1971; Shubik, Martin, Games for Society, Business and War: Towards a Theory of Gaming, New York, Elsevier, 1975; Guetzkow, Harold et. al. (eds) Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1963; Hermann, Charles F. and Margaret G., “An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I,” in American Political Science Review, LXI, June 1967; Coplin, William D., "Inter-Nation Simulation and Contemporary Theories of International Relations,” in American Political Science Review, LX, September 1966, pp. 562-578, -- Simulation in the Study of Politics, Chicago, Markham, 1968; Singer, J. David, (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insight and Evidence, New York, The Free Press, 1968, Bobrow, David B. and Judah L. Schwartz, (eds), Computers and the Policy-Making Community, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1968; Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987.  Many of the works cited overlap in their approaches and methodologies.
[8] See, for example, Haas, Ernest B., Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford University Press, 1964; Singer, J. David, “The Global System and its Sub-System: A Developmental View”, in James N. Rosenau (ed) (1969) op. cit., pp.22-23; Mansbach, Richard W., Yale H. Ferguson and Donald E. Lampart, The Web of World Politics: Non-State Actors in the Global System, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976; Nye, Joseph S., and Robert O. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973; Keohane and Nye, (1977), op. cit.
[9] Nye and Keohane (1973), p.xi, Keohane and Nye (1977), op.cit.
[10] Zimmern, Sir Alfred, (ed), University Teaching of International Relations, Eleventh International Studies Conference, Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1939, pp. 7-9, and Manning, C.A.W., The University Teaching of Social Sciences: International Relations, Paris, UNESCO, 1954, p. 83.
[11] Aron, Raymond, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, Translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, New York, Praeger, 1968, p. 5.
[12] Boulder, Westview, 1987, p. 3.
[13] See Rosenau in endnote 2.
[14] Jean Racine, second preface to Bajazet, 1676.
[15] See Durkheim, Emile, “Representation individuelles et representation collectives,” in Revue de Métaphysique, V, (1898),  pp 274-302; also his The Division of Labor in Society (1893), Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960.

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